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Nanopierce Tech. v. Depository Trust, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 38 (Sept. 20,
2007) 1
CORPORATE LAW – SECURITIES FRAUD
Summary
Appeal from a district court order dismissing a securities fraud action.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed district court order dismissing Appellants’ securities fraud action.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellants Nanopierce Technologies, Inc. brought several claims relating to securities
fraud against Respondents for misuse of the Stock Borrower Program, which Appellants assert
resulted in a dilutive effect of Nanopierce’s stock value.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 2 regulates and controls securities transactions in
interstate commerce. Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include section
17A, which called for the establishment of a national system to facilitate the clearance and
settlement of securities transactions. Agencies registered under Section 17A are self-regulatory
agencies and stand in the stead of the Securities Exchange Commission 3 to provide clearance
and settlement of broker-to-broker securities transactions. 4 Respondent’s subsidiaries, The
Depository Trust Company (DTC) and The National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC),
are registered clearing agencies under Section 17A.
The DTC primarily operates as a “stock depository” and maintains the physical stock
certificates that brokers deposit on behalf of investors. 5 The NSCC, by contrast, actually
facilitates the clearance and settlement of securities by both acting as a broker intermediary and
by tracking brokers’ transactions. The NSCC operates as a broker intermediary by assuming
payment and delivery obligations of individual brokers. The NSCC tracks transactions by
calculating individual brokers’ payments or delivery obligations due for particular securities over
a designated period. After payment and delivery obligations are calculated, the NSCC transmits
these figures to the DTC. In instances in which delivery obligations are due, the DTC
automatically performs a comparison of the individual broker’s delivery obligations with the
amount of shares the individual broker has on deposit.
If the broker has sufficient shares on deposit to fulfill his or her delivery obligation, those
shares are sent through the NSCC to the DTC account of the buying broker. If the broker has
sold more shares than he or she has on deposit, however, the broker must then exercise one of
two options. One option permits the broker to “buy-in” by purchasing the requisite number of
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shares owed on his or her delivery obligation in the open market. In the alternative, the broker
can wait for shares to become available through the NSCC as it processes transactions.
In effort to eradicate situations in which brokers sell more shares than they have on
deposit, the NSCC created the Stock Borrower Program (SBP). The SBP permits brokers to lend
shares from their DTC accounts to another broker before a failure to deliver takes place. In
effect, the SBP permits brokers to loan securities that they have on deposit with the DTC to
cover a fellow broker’s delivery obligation.
Appellants argued that Respondents manipulated the SBP by generating so-called
“phantom shares” that diluted the value of Nanopierce’s stock. Appellants assert that
Respondents misrepresent their compliance with the SBP procedures as follows: (1) the NSCC
falsely represents its compliance with curing delivery obligations by purchasing stocks from the
open market, asserting that the NSCC instead buys broker requests through the SBP; (2)
Respondents falsely represent that buying broker requests are purchased through the open
market, asserting that Respondents instead purchase stocks through the SBP; (3) Respondents
falsely represent that they efficiently clear and settle securities transactions, asserting that
Respondents permit delivery commitments to remain unfulfilled for extended periods of time; (4)
Respondents falsely represent the number of shares they actually retain, asserting that
Respondents do not include shares “on loan” to other brokers with outstanding delivery
obligations in their figures. In addition, Appellants assert the following non-misrepresentation
based claims: engagement in unfair trade practices, market manipulation, conversion, intentional
interference with contractual relations, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and conspiracy.
The district court dismissed Appellants’ claims, holding that federal law pertaining to
clearance and settlement of securities preempted Appellants’ claims. This appeal followed.
Discussion
The issue before the court was whether Section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 preempts Appellants’ state law claims. The preemption doctrine provides that federal law
trumps conflicting, but otherwise valid, state law. 6 Preemption is a question of law and is
subject to de novo review. 7
At the outset, the Court noted that although the SBP and the rules prescribing its
operation are not federal law per se, the Securities Exchange Commission promulgated the SBP
at the direction of Congress pursuant to Section 17A, and thus the SBP trumps otherwise valid
and conflicting state law. 8 The court noted that although Congress did not expressly preempt
state law in this arena by statutory language, Appellants’ state law claims could still be impliedly
preempted. The court then discussed the implied preemption doctrines of field preemption and
conflict preemption in turn.
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Field Preemption
State law is impliedly preempted under the doctrine of field preemption in instances in
which Congress has legislated in an arena in such a manner that the federal interest is so
dominant that it can be said to “occupy a legislative field.” 9
In the present case, the court concluded that although Congressional legislation indicates
that Congress intended to occupy much of the field in the arena of clearing and settling securities
transactions, the statutory scheme does not warrant the inference that Congress intended to
occupy this entire field. To the contrary, after analyzing the statutory scheme, the court
concluded that Congress intended to preserve all non-conflicting state securities laws.
The court specifically referenced Section 78bb(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
in support of its finding. Section 78bb(a) provides: “[N]othing in this [Act] shall affect the
jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any State over any securities or any person
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this [Act].” 10 In addition, the court relied
upon a provision of Section 17A that provided for the construction of this provision to the same
effect. 11 Moreover, the court referenced an amendment to Section 17A in 1990, which also
provided for states to supplement the federal statutory scheme in the field of clearing and settling
transactions. 12
Conflict Preemption
State law is impliedly preempted under the doctrine of conflict preemption when a party
cannot conceivably comply with both applicable federal law and its intended purpose as well as
applicable state law. 13 The court performed a claim-by-claim analysis of Appellants’ claims to
determine whether compliance with applicable state law presented an obstacle in complying with
Section 17A’s purpose and effect. 14 The court divided Appellants’ claims into two separate
groups, misrepresentation claims and non-misrepresentation claims, and analyzed them in turn.
The court assessed each of Appellants’ misrepresentation claims and concluded that the
NSCC preempted all claims. The court construed each claim, in essence, to challenge either the
procedures or rules prescribed by the NSCC. The court reasoned that the Securities Exchange
Commission approved the procedures and rules of the NSCC and thus any state regulations in
conflict with the operation or existence of the SBP are necessarily preempted.
Just as the court concluded that each of Appellants’ misrepresentation claims were
preempted for confliction with the SBP, the court also found that all of Appellants’ nonmisrepresentation based claims were preempted because each of those claims also overtly
challenged the operation or existence of the SBP.
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Concurring/Dissenting Opinions
HARDESTY, J., with whom DOUGLAS, J. agrees, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Justice Hardesty generally agreed with the majority’s analysis of the doctrine of conflict
preemption. He dissented, however, with the majority’s characterization of Appellants’ claims
as overtly attacking the language of the NSCC. Justice Hardesty reasoned that Appellants’
claims did not directly challenge the language of any of the NSCC rules, but rather the manner in
which Respondents misrepresent their compliance with those rules. Justice Hardesty called for
the reversal of the district court order with respect to Appellants’ misrepresentation claims and
remand of the matter for further proceedings.
Conclusion
The court concluded that the doctrine of conflict preemption operated to preempt all of
Appellants’ state law claims because it found that a party could not be in compliance with both
the federal enactments in the arena of clearing and settling securities as well as Appellants’ state
law claims. The court reasoned that Appellants’ claims were preempted because each claim in
essence challenged the operation or existence of the SBP, which the court found to enjoy the
same status as federal law in a preemption analysis as the Securities Exchange Commission
promulgated the SBP. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court order dismissing
Appellants’ securities fraud action.

